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CHAIRMAN’S SUMMING UP 
KLAUS BECHER
∗ 
he meeting of the European Security Forum on 25 November 2002 was devoted to the 
analysis of European and transatlantic defence-industrial strategies. The main question 
was if and how an intensified transatlantic approach to defence research and 
development (R&D) and procurement would be developing or not, and if not, what such a 
failure to gain some access to US defence dollars for their business would mean for hard-
pressed European defence industries. 
The overwhelming size of the US defence market and the fragmentation of markets in Europe 
add aggravating structural dimensions to the difficult business prospects in this sector after 
years of shrinking or stagnating defence spending in Europe that increasingly leaves European 
players without the necessary critical mass. 
In his presentation, Gordon Adams underlined that the transatlantic gaps in military strategy, 
capabilities and defence spending were getting wider. In this situation, he was critical of the 
fact that US attitudes to defence-industrial cooperation were still dominated by the traditional 
buy-American preference. Adams made the case for more transatlantic cooperation but 
warned that it was not clear yet if the US, as well as the Europeans, would be prepared to 
draw the necessary consequences from this compelling case and create the necessary 
conditions for such cooperation to evolve. 
He claimed that not just European nations but even the US, in spite of its huge defence 
budget, would not be able in the future to afford the required rapid military transformation 
and modernisation on their own. The desired supply-side competition and multitude of 
technological approaches would fade away unless it was recreated on the transatlantic level. 
In addition, both European defence spending and the chance to sell defence-industrial 
products and services to Europe would shrink even more if European defence firms were not 
to survive. This required giving them more market access to the US and favouring 
transatlantic industrial partnerships. 
The idea underlying NATO's new Transformation Command conflicted with the existing 
restrictive technology transfer rules. The joint response force will depend on interoperable 
C4ISR. This can only be achieved with greater US willingness to share such technologies 
with European partners, including reforming some of the “black box” restrictions that have 
plagued transatlantic technology cooperation for decades. The allied transformation command 
will fail in its mission of integrating transformational technologies into European forces if its 
US staff cannot exchange views and data on key transformational capabilities, due to US 
technology transfer restrictions. 
Burkard Schmitt explained that there was no “European defence industry” as such. We were 
instead talking about several different sectors with different structures. Therefore the question 
if Europe's defence industry would survive had to be posed differently: In which of these 
sectors would there be survivors, and who? While in the aerospace sector there were some 
cash-generating programmes in the shorter term, it remained unclear where the money for 
R&D would come from in the mid- and long term. 
                                                           
∗ Helmut Schmidt Senior Fellow for European Security at the International Institute for Security Studies (IISS) 
in London. 
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Clearly, the low level of defence spending in most European countries was at the heart of the 
problem, with Germany playing the key role. It was not so much the overall spending level 
that was to blame but the way in which and on what the available funds were spent. Gordon 
Adams added that above all properly coordinated and strategically targeted R&D programmes 
would be important to halt the demise of European defence industries. 
Burkard Schmitt and Gordon Adams both found that after the end of the cold war, the 
transatlantic defence-industrial scene was driven by industry-led cooperation under the 
pressure of globalisation toward transnational industrial consolidation while governments 
remained “behind the curve” and failed to grasp and match this trend, especially by removing 
bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles. Reasons cited included the lack of harmonisation of 
national armaments requirements, the persistence of national defence market protection rules 
and the traditional desire to minimise reliance on foreign supplies. 
In this situation, European defence investment does not render enough value for money. 
European nations continue to disagree, however, on the strategy to address the problem. On 
the one side, the UK is determined to always buy the most appropriate equipment even if this 
often means going to the US, and tries to exploit efficiencies from deregulation, flexibility, 
smart procurement and public-private partnership models while preserving competition on a 
transnational level. On the other side, in France and also Germany, to varying degrees, the 
desire to preserve a national defence-industrial base is still dominant.  
The Letter of Intent process in Europe, geared at creating the proper legal and administrative 
framework for a successful European defence industry after its transnational restructuring, 
had at first looked encouraging but it does not make good for the absence of actual 
programmes. In Burkard Schmitt's judgment, the intergovernmental cooperation process in 
Europe was bound to fail, and an institutional quantum leap was needed. The defence market 
should be governed by EU Commission rules but the procurement system should be kept 
flexible, avoiding a large management agency that would be counterproductive. 
Some nations hoped that armaments cooperation with the US, even in a junior partner or mere 
customer role, could help to gain respect and influence in Washington. It was lamentable, 
though, that such transatlantic cooperation was pursued on a bilateral basis – inherently weak 
– and not through European institutions. In this context, Gordon Adams's observation was 
relevant that even under OCCAR's novel approach to industrial return, there was still no 
incentive for including additional countries in cooperative projects. 
Recent US initiatives that would allow more transatlantic defence-industrial cooperation, 
including the relaxation of export-control obstacles to defence trade with close allies, equal 
treatment of qualified foreign-controlled defence firms and harmonisation of related 
regulations continue to face strong political resistance within the US, both for proliferation 
fears and national industrial interests. As Gordon Adams stressed, the engagement of BAE 
Systems in the US was important as an effort to establish bona fides for overseas defence 
firms in the US with Congress and the Pentagon. 
It remained to be seen whether the Bush administration would show political leadership on 
this issue vis-à-vis opposing forces in Congress and elsewhere. The US tendency to 
distinguish between “good” and “better” allies was bound to create problems for Europe as 
France and Germany would probably be treated differently than the UK, undermining the 
basis for multilateralism and transnational companies.  C HAIRMAN’S SUMMING UP 
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For Europeans, access to US technology is desirable. For European companies, access to a 
share of the US defence-spending cake is vital. This raises the crucial question: Does the US 
have an interest in preserving and strengthening European defence-industrial capacities 
through more intense transatlantic cooperation that benefits Europe? And would Washington 
actually be willing to sustain the continued existence of a European defence research and 
development base in Europe? 
In assessing the strength of possible political and military motivations on the part of the US in 
favour of transatlantic defence cooperation, one obvious argument for such a US interest 
remains that the cohesion of the North-Atlantic alliance would otherwise suffer. However, the 
need for interoperability as such would not require the nourishing of a European defence 
industry if the US were willing to sell its cutting-edge products and the Europeans willing to 
bankroll such purchases in spite of the lack of technological spin-offs, jobs gains and political 
autonomy usually associated with home-made defence products. 
While Burkard Schmitt believed that there was no need for the US to cooperate for industrial, 
budgetary or technological reasons, Gordon Adams suggested that there were actually some, 
though not many network-centric warfare technologies in Europe that would indeed provide 
attractive opportunities for partnering if existing mistrust of Europe and European technology 
in the US defence establishment could be overcome and Europeans showed enough flexibility 
to take advantage of the chances offered in the process of network-centric transformation. The 
US offer to cooperate on missile defence, however, was purely driven by the political desire 
to offer incentives for allied political support. 
The Russian speaker, Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow-based Centre for Analyses of 
Strategies and Technologies, did not submit a written paper. In his oral remarks, he underlined 
that Russia had inherited 80% of the Soviet Union's defence industry while 20% were now 
outside the country. This provided Russia with a full, autonomous spectrum of R&D and 
production capacities. The sector was characterised, however, by pervasive duplication and 
redundancy and until two years ago the traditional preference for state-run enterprises over 
more competitive private ones had still been dominant. 
After 10 years of rather plan-less restructuring and privatisation, there was still no 
encompassing vision. The government had decided, though, that in the further course of 
restructuring it would want to create 10-20 defence holding firms as stock companies with 
51% state ownership. The war in Chechnya had determined the priorities for production but 
also given new impulses for research and development due to increased demand for new 
equipment such as UAVs, night-vision equipment and joint C3I assets. 
With regard to international arms cooperation, Russia had a choice between East and West, 
and it was likely that both orientations would continue to co-exist. In the past, Russia's 
international defence-cooperation projects had been failures, mainly because they had been 
driven by political, not economic rationales. There was now noticeable Indian and Chinese 
influence based on their desire to use the existing, still superior Russian design and 
development capabilities, e.g. in the Su-30 and Su-27 programmes. For example, India would 
pay for the R&D in such programmes, while Russia would keep the intellectual property and 
also buy the resulting products for itself. 
There was also cooperation with EADS, mainly for the manufacturing of spare parts and 
fuselage components. The experience was that more ambitious programmes such as the 
Russian/Ukrainian alternative to the A400M did not go though. This had created the feeling in  K LAUS BECHER 
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Russia that cooperation in areas more sensitive than transport, such as missile defence, would 
also be unlikely to materialise. European cooperation partners, in particular, were seen as no 
help to Russia in the defence-industrial sector since they had insufficient budgets. 
For Russia's defence trade, the most attractive niche was to sell to customers who could or 
would not buy US or European products, such as the Chinese. Only few such customers 
however provided economically rewarding markets. Iran, where Russia was risking US ire, 
was also not paying well. In airlift services, Russians and Ukrainians now held 50% of the 
world market with the old An-124, good for another 15 years. There would be no new 
Russian heavy transport plane. 
The discussion that followed the introductory speakers' remarks, with participation of EU 
Commission, EU Military Staff and NATO International Staff officials, touched on a number 
of interesting issues. One US participant asked why there was not more of an effort among 
Europeans to “just do it” and concentrate on important niches where the US wasn't ready to 
share its technology even with close allies, such as JDAMs and UAVs. One reason cited why 
this strategy wasn't being pursued was that the big European firms were above all focusing 
their efforts on keeping their role as systems integrators. 
There was also some discussion of the motivations behind US companies' purchases of 
smaller European firms. Opinions differed whether this was just “cherry-picking” made easy 
by the strong US market power or whether it was part of a deliberate strategic approach for 
global control of certain strategic technologies. While in many cases, good business 
opportunities were simply taken, in some cases, including the purchase of German cutting-
edge submarine manufacturer HDW, there were most likely other, more strategic 
considerations involved. 
On the main questions raised during the meeting in the context of transatlantic defence 
cooperation, a certain degree of consensus was forming: 
•  It was obvious that Europe's approach to the issue had so far lacked adequate top-level 
political guidance and sustained political will based on a defined set of priorities. 
Gordon Adams suggested that the choices the UK had made in its defence-industrial 
policy went in the right direction. Doubts remained, though, if the matter stood a 
chance in other European countries to be recognised as important enough by 
politicians and the public for generating sufficient attention and determination.  
•  It also was apparent that in the future there would be a stronger EU Commission role 
in this field, including export controls and trade policy. This dimension was not 
captured by the “dumb” bilateral approach so far pursued by the US in its negotiations 
with European governments.  
•  Much could be gained through a coherent European approach to negotiations with the 
US. First of all, the task would be to influence the ongoing review of defence trade 
and technology transfer policies and the US debate, especially in Congress, on these 
issues.  
•  Essentially, however, the problem would boil down to the need for maintaining a 
sufficient level of well-directed European spending for defence R&D and 
procurement.  
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TRANSATLANTIC DEFENCE-INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AND 
AMERICAN POLICY 
GORDON ADAMS
* 
Introduction 
Defence industrial cooperation across the Atlantic has fallen on bad days in recent years. 
The number of official transatlantic defence has dwindled to a handful, of which the 
frequently-threatened MEADS air defence system is the most notable.
1 Increasingly, for 
major defence acquisition programs, such as air transport and missiles, European governments 
are showing an inclination to “buy European”, while the US tradition of “buy American” 
remains as hardy as ever. 
Industry joint ventures such as Thales-Raytheon Systems have yet to generate business 
growth. Strategic partnerships, such as that between EADS and Northrop Grumman, have yet 
to bear significant fruit in the form of access for firms on one side of the Atlantic to the 
defence market on the other side. The most successful transatlantic market access has gone to 
the few, largely British defence companies (especially BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce) that 
have established themselves in the only growing defence acquisition market in the 
transatlantic region – the United States. 
Nor is transatlantic defence cooperation being encouraged by growth in the European defence 
acquisition market. Although the substantial market shrinkage of the past decade has been 
largely halted, only the French defence acquisition market seems poised to grow; cuts 
continue in the UK, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Spain and the Netherlands.
2 A reversal of this 
trend seems unlikely in the near future. 
There are significant and growing obstacles to achieving a more open and flexible 
transatlantic regime for defence industrial and technological cooperation. Most of these 
obstacles are the result of government policies, principally in the United States, but 
increasingly in Europe, as well. Despite these negative signs for the transatlantic industrial 
relationship, the logic of stronger defence industrial and technological cooperation remains 
compelling. For this logic to prevail, however, the transatlantic obstacles will need to be 
overcome. It is not yet clear that policy-makers are prepared to take the necessary steps, but 
the policy options are relatively clear.  
                                                           
* Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. 
1 Although the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has a number of European participants, it does not qualify as an official 
transatlantic program. It is, rather, a US programme with European participants, of which the UK is by far the 
most equal. JSF is, however, a harbinger of things to come – a dominant US program, whose growth could 
gradually drive European producers out of the airframe business. 
2 The British defence budget is slated to grow 1.2% a year after inflation thorough 2005-2006; French equipment 
budgets are expected to grow just below 1.0% a year, after inflation through 2008. German defence budgets will 
remain flat, which will mean decline in constant euro, though a German budget review is currently under way. 
The Italian defence budget is projected to grow significantly, but much of the additional funding will be 
dedicated to personnel as a transition takes place to a smaller, all volunteer force. See IISS, "NATO and non-
NATO Europe," The Military Balance, 2002-2003, pp. 248-49 and Ministere de la Defence, Programmation 
Militaire 2003-2008: Project de Loi de Programmation, Paris: Ministere de la Defence, September 2002.  G ORDON ADAMS 
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The case for transatlantic cooperation 
Strategic divergence and convergence 
Over the 1990s, strategic visions between Europe and the United States began to diverge 
sharply. The US emerged as the dominant global power and has become a less and less 
reluctant sheriff in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. A new, initially 
hesitant administration is now fully engaged, with forces operating against terrorist on a 
global basis and a full-scale attack in Iraq waiting in the wings. In service of this engagement, 
US forces are being transformed for even more global operations, acquiring network-centric 
technology that puts them years, if not decades, ahead of any other country's capabilities. 
In Europe, with Britain and France each deciding to abandon defence autonomy and fully 
commit to the EU Headline Goal, there has been more dramatic progress toward a common 
European security policy and defence capability than in the preceding four decades. However, 
there is still no European strategic vision to accompany the Headline Goal forces. For fifty 
years the strategic attention of Europe has been focused on European security issues, with 
declining attention to global security concerns. This has left a large “vision gap” with the 
United States, with significant impact on comparative capabilities.
3 
While French and British forces have undergone significant changes – conventional force 
personnel reductions, reforms, and, in the French case, professionalisation – few other major 
European countries, especially Germany, have set out on the road of trading personnel for real 
capability. Shrunken European defence budgets remain heavily focused on personnel 
spending. Acquisition euros are in short supply and research and development budgets fall 
very short both of US funding (roughly four times as great) and of a level that would produce 
network centric or transformational technologies in Europe.  
With September 11 and the emergence of proliferation and terrorism as major security 
concerns, however, a new common strategic interest is emerging across the Atlantic. The old 
NATO rationale is gone, but the Prague summit will reflect a new concern, beyond ensuring 
the continued stability of troubled European regions. Proliferation and the threat of weapons 
of mass destruction delivered by multiple means concerns Europe as much as it does the 
United States. And the terrorist threat, while not new, now poses a danger of asymmetrical 
nature and significant magnitude both to Europe and the United States. Confronting these 
threats together is clearly preferable to diverging policies across the Atlantic. Even, in fact, 
especially in coalitions of the willing, the partners continue to need interoperability, especially 
as network centric technologies become central to military operations. 
The logic of cooperation is having an impact on governments in the NATO region, as 
reflected at the Prague summit. The US Missile Defense Agency is explicitly encouraging 
allied participation in the BMD program, a goal underpinned by NATO-funded research 
efforts in missile defence. The NATO summit has endorsed a reframing of the 1999 Defence 
Capabilities Initiative that focuses on interoperability investments, especially those that 
support network-centric warfare, such as secure command, communications and information. 
The US has proposed creating a NATO rapid reaction force, capable of conducting out-of-
area operations, which is likely to be adopted by the Alliance.
4 Such a force will require 
                                                           
3 See Gordon Adams, "Seeking Strength in Numbers: The European Allies and US Defense Planning," in Cindy 
Williams (ed.), Holding the Line: US Defense Alternatives for the Early 21`st Century, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2001, pp.79-117, and Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness, Policy Review 113 (June-July 2002). 
4 A prototype of such a force has been described as "a small, elite, mobile expeditionary force...maintained at 
high readiness, capable of swiftly projecting power to distant areas outside Europe and then conducting  A N AMERICAN VIEW 
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dedicated funding and interoperable technologies, increasing the incentive for transatlantic 
collaboration in these areas. Finally, NATO may, once again, endorse a common air-ground 
surveillance system (AGS), with a possible transatlantic technological solution that requires 
transatlantic industry collaboration. 
Budgetary pressures  
The limited European defence budgets provide a particularly compelling rationale for 
Europeans to seek a flexible transatlantic industry and technology regime. Limited budgets for 
defence investment, in particular, could prove to be the Achilles' heel of the EU effort to 
create a Headline Goal force with effective transportation, air power, precision-guided 
munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, and C4ISR. The NATO summit decisions could add to 
this budgetary pressure. Europeans will want to be certain that investment dedicated to a new 
NATO RRF does not compete with investments required for the Headline Goal force.
5 
However, the new joint force and the AGS programme constitute clear incentives to 
transatlantic industrial cooperation. Access to US defence technologies through transatlantic 
cooperation could provide substantial cost savings to the Europeans. Combined with 
reprioritisation of European budgets to focus on transformational technologies, resources 
could be focused on the most compelling capability needs.  
Despite rapid defence budget growth, the US could share this interest. Even projected US 
acquisition budgets are inadequate, given the dual requirements for equipment modernisation 
and transformational technologies, combined with growing personnel and operational costs. 
As the US budget deficit grows, future defence budgets will come under further pressure. 
Stronger, competitive transatlantic options for defence equipment could be part of the answer 
to this budget dilemma. 
For both the US and Europe, a more integrated industry and technology regime that 
encouraged industry collaboration would provide defence policy-makers with enhanced 
choices, competition and flexibility in defence acquisition. As industry has consolidated, the 
number of providers of defence platforms has declined, constraining defence ministry options 
in Europe and for the DOD. The advantages of competition, in pricing, technical capability 
and timing, are slowly being lost. A broader array of technical options would be available for 
defence planners and costs could be better controlled, a significant advantage within 
constrained investment budgets. 
Technology advantages 
The communications, information, networking, sensoring and satellite technologies that are 
critical to network centric warfare and combined operations are widely dispersed and 
commercial in origin. The capacity to integrate these technologies into military applications is 
less dispersed, limited largely to American and a very few European companies. European 
firms, particularly Thales, BAE Systems and EADS, possess the commercial technologies in 
abundance and are increasingly capable of integrating those technologies in defence systems.
6 
There are clearly advantages to greater flexibility in the technology transfer regimes between 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
demanding combat operations with US forces in a wide spectrum of contingencies." See Hans Binnendijk and 
Richard Kugler, “Transforming European Forces”, Survival, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Autumn 2002), p. 118. 
5 Binnendijk and Kugler argue that the NATO force will require minimal resources – perhaps two% of current 
European NATO defence spending – and draw largely on existing capabilities. See source above, p. 129. 
6 See Frost and Sullivan, "European Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Market," Report B055-16, 2002 and the panel reports of the European 
Institute' Interoperability Project, 2001.  G ORDON ADAMS 
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these two continents and significant downsides to either side shutting itself off from the 
technologies available to the other side. A flexible regime across the Atlantic for such 
technology transfers, combined with more common barriers to its dispersal elsewhere, could 
be in the interests of both. 
An industrial logic 
As developments in the European shipbuilding, ground systems, and aircraft industries 
suggest, it is increasingly difficult for European industry to sustain itself on European 
acquisition spending, alone. Given such limits, the incentive for European defence industries 
to gain access to the US market is growing grow. Major US defence firms, while less 
dependent on the international market, are losing their historic access to the European market. 
Traditional access to Europe through direct sales is no longer acceptable. Only partnerships 
with European firms will provide future access and these are viable only if there is reciprocity 
in the policies governments pursue on both sides.
7  
US and European policies create obstacles 
The defence industry on both sides of the Atlantic has recognised and responded to these 
incentives for greater cooperation for a number of years now. The same cannot be said for 
government policies, which create growing obstacles to a more flexible transatlantic regime. 
The United States 
The barriers to entry into the American defence market are major obstacles to a more 
transparent, open and flexible transatlantic defence industrial relationship. They are largely 
based on government policies, many of which have existed for decades and are difficult to 
change. US Defense Department acquisition and defence trade policies are major obstacles. 
They include a strong and understandable DOD preference for buying US defence 
technologies, which are seen as significantly more advanced than comparable European 
technologies. There is also a strong DOD preference to protect US defence technological 
leadership and carefully restrict European access to US technical know-how. These 
preferences are reinforced by a guarded DOD approach to technology transfer and direct 
foreign investment by non-US defence suppliers in R&D and production facilities in the 
United States.  
Beyond DOD, the State Department, which administers the review of more than 45,000 
export license requests a year, takes a generally conservative view of the export of 
technologies on their Munitions List to any other country, including members of the EU. 
Export control rules written during the Cold War have been extended since then, with the 
policy bureaucracies remaining concerned about the risk of the loss of technological 
superiority and the proliferation of capabilities that could be used, one day, against the United 
States.  
There are also substantial hurdles in the way of direct non-US investment in the US market. 
While some firms, notably BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce have succeeded in overcoming 
these barriers, few other European firms have done so. The Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States (CFIUS) system for screening non-US direct investment in the US 
economy can be a deterrent to entry. The security rules surrounding such investment, 
                                                           
7 There is a growing tendency among US prime contractors to focus on the short-term growth in US defence 
acquisition and to set aside, for now, this transatlantic interest. Changes in European acquisition practices could 
further constrain access to the European market, however.  A N AMERICAN VIEW 
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controlled by the US Defense Department, essentially cut US operations off from their non-
US parents, are a further deterrent.  
Executive branch policies in Washington are mirrored by political concern in the US 
Congress, where defence technology export licensing and technology transfer issues and 
direct investment by European firms in the American defence economy have been hotly 
debated over the past decade.  
Substantial effort was invested in the late 1990s in trying to overcome some of the more 
frustrating obstacles to transatlantic defence industry collaboration.
8 The Defense 
Department's system for reviewing export licenses was substantially streamlined, and a more 
flexible special security arrangement negotiated with Rolls Royce's US operations. Secretary 
of Defense William Cohen negotiated Declarations of Principle (DOP) on reforms in defence 
trade relationships with the government of Australia and the United Kingdom. After 
considerable struggle, broader export licensing regimes were introduced at State. In particular, 
following the May 2000 announcement of the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI), other 
countries may be eligible to negotiate a waiver for certain trade under the International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which govern State's process for export licenses, provided those 
negotiations led to a compatible export control regime in that country. 
The US reforms of the late 1990s largely ground to a halt with the arrival of a new 
administration in Washington, DC. The Defense Department has not continued the previous 
administration's effort to further reform its internal licensing process and no new special 
security arrangements have been negotiated with non-American subsidiaries in the United 
States. DOD has been reluctant to release technologies that might tie into weapons of mass 
destruction or the means of delivering WMD. Although a DOP has been negotiated with 
Sweden, there appear to be no plans to initiate such talks with other governments. With 
respect to specific technology transfers, DOD (and State) have allowed German access to 
UAV technology, particularly the Global Hawk airframe, and for Italy with respect for the 
Predator UAV, but there has been no broader policy decision. In general the tone of DOD 
policy with respect to transatlantic defence industry cooperation has been less forward leaning 
than in the prior administration.  
The State Department has continued negotiations with the UK and Australia on an ITAR 
exemption as described in the DTSI, but those talks continue to proceed very slowly. The 
greatest obstacle continues to be a cautious State Department view about whether the UK 
must legally enforce US third-country transfer rules and regulations or whether a British 
government policy with the same effect is adequate The agreements may come to a 
conclusion in the next few months, but will face implementation obstacles in the US, given 
Congressional resistance to any ITAR exemptions. There has been no consideration given to 
opening a multilateral dialogue on export controls and technology transfer questions with the 
leading European arms producers. A part of the State Department Munitions List, which 
itemises controlled products and technologies, has been reviewed, but there has been little 
attempt to actually reduce the size of the list itself. Investment rules have not been changed. 
The DOS bureaucracy that processes export licenses has been streamlined, connected 
electronically to other agencies with equities in the license decision, and has received an 
increase in personnel. The shape of its underlying task has not been changed, however.  
                                                           
8 For a discussion of the US reform process between 1996 and 2000, see Gordon Adams, "Fortress America in a 
Changing Transatlantic Defence Market", in Burkhard Schmitt (ed.), Between Cooperation and Competition: 
The Transatlantic Defence Market (Chaillot Paper No. 44), Paris: Western European Union, January 2001.  G ORDON ADAMS 
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Until late 2002, there has been little attention paid by the new administration to questions of 
transatlantic defence industrial and technological cooperation. Policy-makers were 
preoccupied with the war on terrorism, which actually increased concern over the possible 
release of technology that might be used for weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles. 
In October 2002, the National Security Council finally began a long-delayed review process, 
issuing instructions to agencies to review the broad agenda of defence trade, technology 
transfer, transatlantic technology cooperation, and US arms transfer policies, export controls 
and advocacy. Details of the review are not publicly available, though it is said to cover the 
definition of options for closer cooperation, the changes in policy, regulation and law that 
might be necessary for such cooperation, and the risks that might accompany cooperation 
with specific countries. 
Western Europe 
Although it is not the purpose of this paper to examine European policy closely, it is worth 
noting that the historically open European defence market may be in the process s of closing 
substantially, as part of the “Europeanisation” of overall defence policies and defence 
industrial policies, in particular. The EU commitment to the Headline Goal, declining 
European defence budgets, and the consolidation of the European defence industry are having 
an impact on European defence acquisition decisions and emerging defence industrial and 
technology base. Gradually, a tendency may be emerging to protect the European defence 
industrial and technology base from American domination, and to sustaining a European 
industrial and technological capability to sustain and support the broader security goals of a 
uniting Europe. 
The “buy-European” preference may be indicated by the European commitment to the Meteor 
missile and the A-400M transport aircraft. These two decisions could signal a future in which 
EU members buy major hardware platforms from European suppliers, with smaller 
procurements being more transatlantic.
9 European governments have encouraged the creation 
of European counterparts and competitors to US defence industrial giants to meet these needs 
and, as the Headline Goals of the ESDP have been more sharply defined, these capabilities are 
being looked to for the necessary equipment and technologies, including air transport, sealift, 
precision-guided munitions and unmanned aerial vehicles.
10 
There is also a growing cross-national trend to create European-level institutions and policies 
to provide the legal setting and road map for European defence acquisition policies and 
defence industry behaviour. Such harmonisation is seen as necessary for a healthy, cross-
national industrial base, as well as to ensure that this industry does not escape governmental 
scrutiny and controls.
11 Under the July 2000 “framework agreement”, six countries (UK, 
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and Spain) have undertaken to harmonise practices and 
regulations on export controls, security of supply, the security of classified information and 
                                                           
9 They are consistent with a longer European history of creating and subsidising cross-border defence platforms, 
including the Eurofighter, the NH-90 and Tiger helicopter programs, and a large number of MBDA missile 
programs. 
10 See Gordon Adams, “Convergence or Divergence? The Future of the Transatlantic Defence Industry”, in 
Simon Duke (ed.), Between Vision and Reality: CFSP's Progress on the Path to Maturity, Maastricht: European 
Institute for Public Administration, 2000, pp. 161-208. 
11 Author's interviews with government officials in France, Germany and the UK, summer 2001.  A N AMERICAN VIEW 
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industrial security, defence research and development, the treatment of technical information, 
and defence requirements.
12 
Four of these nations – France, Germany, the UK and Italy – have also created a joint defence 
acquisition organisation in 1996 – known as OCCAR for its French name (Organisation 
Conjointe de Cooperation en Matière d'Armement) to manage the growing number of 
collaborative  among these countries, including, ultimately, the A400M. OCCAR is 
increasingly seen as the prototype of a European defence acquisition agency, which may 
emerge in the EU framework with expanded membership sometime in the future.
13 
As the EU member states protect employment in the defence industry and move to stimulate a 
European R&D technology base in advanced defence technologies, two tendencies may 
appear. First, European level institutions will be increasingly tasked with regulatory 
responsibilities for this activity.
14 As one EU official has put it: “You cannot have a defence 
policy for 15 and an industrial base harmonised at six.”
15 Second, this emerging European 
industrial and technology base will be protected from the United States. European 
governments will be willing to pay a premium for defence equipment, and acquire slightly 
less advanced technology, more slowly, in order to support this base.  
What is the alternative to the “two fortresses”? 
The goal of a more flexible transatlantic regime would be an industrial and technological 
relationship that is more reciprocal, integrated and transparent, while ensuring that critical 
defence technologies leak as little as possible to potentially threatening states. It should be 
based on first principles:  
•  A multilateral approach. Given the evolution of the European market, industries and 
institutions, it is increasingly important that this relationship take on a multilateral, as 
opposed to a bilateral character. The days of serial bilateral negotiations on defence 
industrial and technology issues are numbered; a chain of bilateral agreements will be 
broken by the reality that the Europeans are rapidly evolving a multilateral process for 
such issues. NATO is not the best forum for such negotiations; the European process 
will eventually be institutionalised in the European Union. Negotiations should take 
                                                           
12 The intent of this process is to “create the political and legal framework necessary to facilitate industrial 
restructuring in order to promote a more competitive and robust European defence technological and industrial 
base in the global defence market and thus to contribute to the construction of a common European security and 
defence policy.” Preamble to the Framework Agreement between the French Republic, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the 
European Defence Industry, signed at Farnborough, United Kingdom, 27 July 2000. 
13 Interviews in Brussels, Paris, Berlin and London, Summer 2001. See also Christophe Cornu, “Fortress Europe: 
Real or Virtual?”, in Adams, Cornu, James and Schmitt, Between Cooperation and Competition: The 
Transatlantic Defence Marke, (Chaillot Paper No. 44), Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the Western 
European Union, January 2001, pp. 77-80. 
14 The European Union does not yet have a coherent defence industrial and technology policy, but there is 
considerable interest in the Commission in having such a policy and an emerging interest in the Council of 
Ministers, as well. Current Commission responsibilities for industrial policy, dual-use research and development, 
public procurement, customs policies, and dual-use technology exports controls will inevitably lead to greater 
involvement in the defence industrial and technology arena. The Council, through its Armaments Policy 
committee, currently has what responsibility exists at the EU level. See Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Implementing European Union Strategy on Defence-
Related Industries, COM(97)583 Final, Brussels, December 4, 1997, Annex I, p. 2. 
15 Interview in Brussels, summer 2001.  G ORDON ADAMS 
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place directly between the North Americans and a European grouping, four, six or the 
EU, as appropriate.  
•  A broad strategic agenda. The issues in such a negotiation should be approached as a 
strategic agenda, not as discrete parts. All are important to creating the new 
transatlantic regime; treating them together will provide opportunities for tradeoffs in 
negotiations that can lead to a successful outcome.  
•  A search for best practices. The participants will need to check their superiority at 
the door. One key reason for the slowness of the US/UK ITAR negotiations has been 
the US insistence that the Europeans level up their export control regimes by 
incorporating US statutes and practices into British law. There are areas in which the 
Europeans may have best practices. The parties need to do best practice research with 
each other, not seek extraterritorial enforcement of national legislation.  
The negotiations themselves should address a number of issues:  
•  Strategy:  The United States and its European allies should invest in a common 
discussion of the elements of global strategy that they share: shared responsibilities for 
stability operations in Europe, common approaches to combating terrorism, and joint 
policies on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This dialogue needs to 
take place within NATO, but also needs to be engaged between NATO and the EU as 
the latter shapes the Headline Goal force and its equipment needs.  
•  Military planning: Strategy review processes on both sides of the Atlantic need to 
draw the others into their national discussions, with a more joint set of conversations 
over defence requirements, force planning, and hardware objectives in order to define 
equipment needs that could be met by consortia or partnerships among industrial 
suppliers and technology companies on both sides of the Atlantic.  
•  Budgets: European defence acquisition resources need to be increased or seriously 
reallocated. British and French decisions have already refocused budgets toward 
acquisition; further force tradeoffs may not be possible. To ensure continued 
leadership in the EU and to focus on the technological target, Germany, in particular, 
needs to make a greater budgetary effort overall and a major internal reallocation. 
Budget planning cycles among key countries should also incorporate participation 
from the other countries.  
•  Research and Development: R&D will be the heart of the solution to the capability 
gap. The Europeans need to grow their R&D budgets and undertake much more 
significant harmonisation of than they have to date, if R&D investments are to be cost-
effective. There is a need for a more serious transatlantic defence R&D dialogue, as 
well. Today, there is scepticism in the US that the Europeans have much to offer 
technologically. Among the Europeans there is a sense that the US does not appreciate 
the technological assets the Europeans bring to the table. A dialogue is urgently 
needed to identify key technologies on both sides that are advantageous to the other 
and shape ways by which those advantages can be harvested.  
•  Export controls, technology transfers, industrial security: The American export 
control system is broken, its technology transfer rules are increasingly self-defeating, 
and industrial security is systematically compromised and strained by emerging 
transnational defence companies. Export control reforms in the United States are 
imperative, including shrinking the Munitions List to critical items, instituting greater 
corporate self-governance with government audits of performance, and creating a  A N AMERICAN VIEW 
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stronger appeals process for disagreements. The European system of controls is going 
multilateral, a negotiation into which the United States has no input. Bilateral 
negotiations cannot work without a multilateral level of discussion between the US 
and the Framework Agreement six.  
•  Direct foreign investment: There are distinct advantages to the DOD  from greater 
transatlantic defence investment and industry advantage in access to the European 
market, for partnerships, investments and government sales. There is a clear win/win 
to be had from shaping multilateral rules of the road. The American process needs 
streamlining, with more supple rules for firms and countries that do a respectable job 
of protecting technology flows. The defence security arrangements surrounding non-
US-owned assets in the United States need review and reform, building trust, rather 
than separation, across the Atlantic. The European need to be drawn into this dialogue 
in order to ensure national and EU policies on direct foreign investment and 
competition do no inhibit reciprocal access to the European market.  
•  Dual-use technologies: US acquisition rules that overburden commercial firms with 
contracting and reporting requirements currently imposed on defence contractors will 
ultimately deny DOD access to the technologies it needs. The DOD needs to 
undertake a “forced march” through the undergrowth of rules and regulations it still 
has in place. European rules on dual-use technology appear more flexible and should 
be part of a dialogue on this subject. That dialogue will inevitably involve the EU, 
since dual-use rules are within the Commission's competence, as related both to 
research and development and export controls.  
•  Acquisition rules: It will be difficult to reshape acquisition regimes among the 
Europeans, let alone across the Atlantic. This effort should begin, however, as 
acquisition practices and rules make cross-border procurement difficult and can 
discriminate against non-national suppliers. No defence contractor will happily engage 
in a partnership bid if the rules are complex, overwritten or unclear. The US should 
engage the member countries of OCCAR in a common review of acquisition practices, 
recognising that no country's system provides a perfect guarantee of on-time, within 
cost, on performance military hardware. The OCCAR members need to ensure that 
OCCAR rules and practices are non-discriminatory with regard to non-member firms; 
US acquisition regulations need review to ensure the same is true in DOD.  
•  Industry consolidation: Both Europe and the United States face further 
rationalisation of a defence industry that is largely consolidated at the system 
integrator level. Industry recognises that further rationalisation of capacity will be 
important in order to procure systems cost-effectively within budgetary constraints. 
The acquisition systems on both continents should not create incentives for contractors 
to retain excess capacity, but should encourage capacity shrinkage by allowing some 
contractor retention of the savings gained by doing so. A transatlantic dialogue would 
facilitate the exchange of lessons learned in this process.  
•  Industry's role: More than ever before, the transatlantic regime will be shaped by 
company initiatives and behaviours. Governments are currently behind the curve on 
industry discussions of joint ventures, strategic partnerships and acquisition 
opportunities. Rather than discourage such conversations by political intervention or 
the enforcement of restrictive rules on exports and technology transfers, the 
governments should be ahead of the curve, stimulating such discussions and 
encouraging transatlantic initiatives to provide hardware and system options meeting  G ORDON ADAMS 
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defence requirements. The American industry has a major responsibility here, to take 
the initiative, lobby for changes in the US rules and processes already discussed, and 
provide transparent expertise on how a transatlantic regime should be shaped. The 
European industry has a similar responsibility to help ensure that the Framework 
Agreement, OCCAR and EU processes ensure reciprocal access for Americans to the 
European market. Industry is generally reluctant to step ahead of government 
willingness to change; in this case, government policy will benefit from industry 
initiative and can create a multilateral, transatlantic environment in which industry 
thrives, government benefits and security is enhanced.  
This is a daunting agenda. The alternative, however, is the gradual shrinkage of the 
transatlantic defence market, under political and bureaucratic pressure, the loss of 
interoperability and a growing technology gap between US and European militaries, and a 
loss of technological opportunity for the militaries of both sides. 
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EUROPEAN AND TRANSATLANTIC 
DEFENCE-INDUSTRIAL STRATEGIES 
BURKARD SCHMITT
* 
he history of transatlantic armaments cooperation goes back to the beginning of the 
Cold War. Since then, however, the nature of cooperation has changed considerably, 
from simple licensing of US systems to Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s to co-
production arrangements in the 1970s, followed by government-to-government joint 
development in the 1980s and 1990s. In recent years, industry-led cooperation has become the 
most prominent feature. 
The changing nature of cooperation reflects the changing motivation of the two sides. During 
the first decades after World War II, the US helped to rebuild an exhausted or destroyed West 
European defence industry in the face of the Soviet threat. The more European NATO allies 
recovered economically, the more they sought a more balanced partnership with the US. After 
the end of the Cold War, interoperability became a major argument for enhanced cooperation. 
Since the late 1990s, the technological and financial consequences of globalisation have 
pushed industry towards transnational consolidation and closer transatlantic ties, whereas 
governments have had difficulties matching industry-led initiatives. 
In spite of many good reasons for more transatlantic cooperation and numerous initiatives to 
achieve that objective, the record is rather poor. Arms trade across the Atlantic has remained 
primarily a one-way street from the US to Europe, with few cooperative projects having 
actually been set up and even fewer having been considered as a success. There are several 
reasons for failure: 
•  Since the strategic and force planning processes are conducted independently, 
harmonisation of military requirements is almost impossible.  
•  Market access for foreign companies remains difficult: Whereas the openness of 
European defence markets differs greatly from country to country, the US market is 
well protected against both foreign investments and sales. Moreover, complex rules 
and procedures for defence exports represent major hurdles for industrial cooperation.  
•  In the US, both the political leadership and the armed forces are extremely reluctant to 
rely to any extent on foreign suppliers. On the other hand, in Europe there is 
widespread anxiety in many arms-producing countries about the possibility of US 
market hegemony. Both attitudes make it very hard to create a positive political 
climate for transatlantic armaments cooperation.  
Even more important, transatlantic cooperation is hindered by a fundamental imbalance of 
power between the US and Europe:  
•  The US is by far the biggest defence market of the world. In 2001, the DoD spent 
more than twice as much on defence as all EU members combined. With an increase 
in US defence spending of $48 billion for FY 2003, and further increases planned 
from $396.8 billion in 2003 to $469.8 billion in 2007, the transatlantic financing and 
procurement gap will continue to grow over the next few years.  
•  There also fundamental structural market differences. Due to fragmented defence 
markets and disparate procurement policies, European countries pay a high price for 
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costly duplications and face great difficulties in efficiently combining their resources. 
As a consequence, the EU as a whole gets less value for its money than the US. 
Moreover, the investment profiles are different, the US spending not only in absolute, 
but also in relative terms more on procurement and R&D than Europeans.  
•  The US has such enormous financial resources, defence-industrial assets and military 
capabilities that they simply do not need armaments cooperation or arms imports. 
From the US perspective, the potential benefit of transatlantic cooperation is, at best, 
the cohesion of the Alliance. This argument, however, is hardly sufficient to overcome 
bureaucratic and political resistance. The same is true for interoperability: For many in 
the US, interoperability within the Alliance could best be achieved if Europeans 
simply bought US products. The fact that the US can conduct the whole spectrum of 
military operations without any allied contribution does not help to convince the 
Administration, Congress and armed forces that they need to suffer the trials and 
tribulations of transatlantic cooperation.  
•  In Europe, the situation is, again, completely different: Even the most important arms-
producing countries cannot afford to maintain a purely national Defence Industrial 
Base (DIB). With the exception of certain technological niches, they need 
international cooperation to develop and produce high-tech weaponry. In this context, 
access to US technology is in general considered highly attractive. Moreover, there is 
a strong European interest in interoperability as the prerequisite for coalition-building 
and therefore for political influence in Washington. However, the lack of financial 
resources, national industrial interests and the difficulties involved in transatlantic 
ventures greatly reduces European interest in cooperating with the US.  
•  Last but not least, the US pursues an explicit and coherent strategy for defence-related 
industries, aimed at technological superiority in all relevant sectors. European 
countries, in contrast, do not have the means to implement such a strategy individually 
and lack the political consensus to develop one collectively. As a consequence, 
Europeans have difficulties in developing common positions towards the US on 
armaments issues.  
The imbalance between the US and Europe can also be seen at the corporate level. The 
enormous consolidation process that took place from 1993 to 1997 within US industry 
reinforced European anxieties about the threat of US market hegemony. Facing competition 
from giants such as Boeing-McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed-Martin and Raytheon, Europe's 
national champions and their respective governments (finally) began to accept cross-border 
integration as the only way to avoid being squeezed out of the market and/or forced into 
unbalanced subordinate partnerships. The main result of the restructuring process that 
followed was the creation of three big groups, EADS, BAE Systems and THALES, each of 
them linked to each other and to the remaining groups by numerous international joint 
ventures. 
This industrial movement, in turn, triggered the so-called Letter of Intent (LOI) process 
between the governments of the major European arms-producing countries (France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Sweden). In July 2000, the six partners signed a Framework 
Agreement covering (1) Security of Supply, (2) Transfer and Export Procedures, (3) Security 
of Classified Information, (4) Research and Technology, (5) Treatment of Technical 
Information and (6) Harmonisation of Military Requirements. In these six areas, the partners 
committed themselves to create a more homogeneous regulatory framework in order to 
improve market conditions for an increasingly transnational industry.  A  EUROPEAN VIEW 
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However, and in spite of all its potential virtues, the Framework Agreement does not actually 
establish a common armaments policy. On the contrary, armaments remain in the national 
domain, with defence industrial interests and strategies still diverging.  
•  Among the six LOI countries, France is traditionally the most ambitious about Europe 
becoming an autonomous political actor (although its partners often suspect the real 
objective is simply to use Europe as a means to achieve national ends). In the 1990s, 
France accepted both privatisation and internationalisation of its defence industry as 
indispensable, combining market orientation of companies with the politico-strategic 
objectives of the government. Therefore, France has been a driving force behind the 
restructuring of Europe's Aerospace and Defence Electronics sectors. Aérospatiale-
Matra was brought into EADS and THALES (formerly Thomson-CSF) transformed 
into an international player with strong links to the UK (through the acquisition of 
Racal). In the future, the French government will probably try – again – to bring 
Dassault into a wider European structure and to find a new reference shareholder for 
THALES. The main challenge, however, will be land armaments and naval 
shipbuilding, where the privatisation of GIAT and DCN is still pending. The poor 
shape of the two former arsenals represents not only an important financial burden 
upon the French government, it is also a major obstacle to greater openness of the 
French defence market and makes it de facto impossible for Paris to push for 
European mergers (since both companies are rather unattractive as potential partners).  
•  The UK's industrial policy is characterised by a “value for money” policy, which 
includes relative openness of its defence market for foreign competitors. This 
openness also compensates for a growing lack of competition in the national market. 
In fact, after the takeover of GEC Marconi by British Aerospace and the recent 
acquisition of Vickers by Alvis, there are two national champions left which distorts 
the market-led approach that the British claim to champion. To counterbalance this 
dominance and to create a second “national” defence electronics supplier competing 
with BAE Systems, London accepted, for example, the takeover of Racal by 
THALES. Competition may also come from American companies that regularly team-
up with British firms for bids in the UK. Transatlantic cooperation in general is 
welcomed not only for political reasons, but also as a means to benefit from US 
technology.  
•  In Germany, the largest part of the aerospace industry is now integrated into EADS. 
The government has failed, by contrast, to convince land armament and naval 
shipbuilding industries to follow the same approach – first national consolidation, then 
European integration. Germany's leading land systems companies – Krauss-Maffei 
and Rheinmetall – continue to resist any political pressure to merge. In naval 
shipbuilding, government plans have also failed. Instead of joining forces with 
Thyssen Krupp Industries, Babcock Borsig sold its 75% share in HDW to the US 
investment fund Equity One Partners. Since HDW is a world leader in conventional 
submarines, this deal has stimulated a debate about a sell-out of German key 
technologies. Many observers now fear that Krauss-Maffei could become the next 
candidate for a politically incorrect takeover.  
•  Italy, Spain and Sweden have all tried to integrate their defence industrial assets into 
wider international structures, without pursuing a clear European preference. The 
Spanish government has integrated Casa into EADS, but preferred General Dynamic's 
bid for Santa Barbara over Rheinmetall's offer; the Italian government has pushed 
Finmeccanica – with more or less success – to integrate its units into European joint  B URKARD SCHMITT 
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ventures, but left the A 400M programme and joined the F-35 programme. In Sweden, 
certain industrial elements have been linked to European networks (see Saab), whilst 
others have been sold to US investors (Bofors).  
Industrial policy is only one aspect of largely divergent armament policies in Europe. Another 
example is the somewhat uncoordinated way in which the LOI countries have embarked on 
bilateral negotiations with the US on regulatory issues. In fact, industrial consolidation in 
Europe, together with the LOI process and the development of ESDP, alarmed Washington 
about the possibility of an emerging “Fortress Europe”. The perceived threat of a closed 
European market, combined with the risk of the lack of any true competition in the US 
market, pushed the Clinton Administration to launch two initiatives: (a) the Defense Trade 
Security Initiative (DTSI) aimed at streamlining the US export control system, and (b) 
bilateral negotiations with certain allies on a “Declaration of Principles on defense equipment 
and industrial cooperation” (DoP). 
Whereas the DoP is de facto a bilateral version of the European LOI, covering a broad range 
of defence trade issues, the DTSI is comprised of 16 procedural reforms to the US export 
control regime. Moreover, it includes the possibility for certain qualified countries to enter 
into negotiations aimed at granting ITAR-license exemptions for unclassified exports to the 
government and to companies identified as reliable. 
Up until now, the DoPs have been signed with the UK; Australia, Norway, Spain and the 
Netherlands, whilst negotiations with Italy seem to be will advanced, whereas discussions 
with Germany and France are, at best, at an early stage. So far, the UK is the only LOI-
country with whom the US has begun to negotiate a binding export control agreement. ITAR-
talks with additional partners are envisaged only after negotiations with the UK have been 
completed. However, under the Bush Administration these transatlantic discussions have 
apparently lost momentum, their future therefore being unclear. Even with the UK, 
negotiations on export controls seem to be experiencing difficulties. However, in general, the 
different stages of negotiations with the partners suggest that Washington still makes a 
distinction between “reliable” and “less reliable” allies.  
Sooner or later, this distinction might create problems for the compatibility of the multilateral 
LOI system and the bilateral DoP approach. It remains to be seen how transatlantic 
arrangements would interact in practice with the LOI Framework Agreement. However, at 
least in certain areas, bilateral agreements with the US might complicate a system whose 
purpose is precisely to simplify and facilitate European cooperation. For example, could a 
European Transnational Defence Company qualify for an ITAR exemption if only one of its 
home countries has an export control agreement with the US? Or, would the ETDC be obliged 
to create new Chinese walls between its different sites, thereby limiting its internal integration 
and acting against the philosophy of the LOI process? 
To operate in such an uncertain and fluid environment is certainly not easy for European 
industries. As has been seen, a European Armaments Policy and a common defence market 
are still a long way off, and defence budgets in Europe remain flat. The enormous difference 
between budgets in Europe and the US represents an irresistible incentive for European 
companies to attempt penetration of the US market. Indeed, access to the US has become a 
major strategic goal for all big industrial players in Europe.  
There are different ways to achieve that objective: 
•  Given the predominant buy-American policy, direct sales of European products to the 
US armed forces will probably remain extremely rare exceptions;   A  EUROPEAN VIEW 
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•  Jointly developed defence systems under a government-to-government agreement will 
remain exceptions as well; European budget constraints on the one hand, and 
difficulties to harmonise the military requirements across the Atlantic on the other, 
will continue to limit the possibilities for intergovernmental projects.  
•  Teaming arrangements with US prime contractors for specific US will be politically 
easier, in particular if the European contribution is limited to sub-systems and 
components. However, the cost-effectiveness of these industrial arrangements depends 
to a considerable degree on the regulatory framework that governments agree on.  
Another possibility to penetrate the US market is to buy an American company and to become 
a “national” supplier to the Pentagon. British companies, in particular BAE Systems, have 
pursued this strategy extensively and with a lot of success. For continental European 
companies, however, this option has been politically unrealistic so far, and there are no signs 
that this might change in the near future. What we have seen, by contrast, is a multiplication 
of joint ventures (Raytheon-THALES) and strategic alliances (EADS-Northrop Grumman).  
In land armaments and shipbuilding, the situation is different. By contrast to aerospace and 
defence electronics, trans-European consolidation has failed in these sectors, leaving 
European companies in a rather weak position vis-à-vis their US counterparts. As the Santa 
Barbara and the HDW takeovers have demonstrated, US investors have therefore a good 
chance simply to “cherry-pick” the European defence industrial base.  
To conclude, there are not many reasons to be overly optimistic about the future of 
transatlantic armaments cooperation. Cooperation will certainly continue, but its intensity will 
probably remain limited by persistent political obstacles. Moreover, cooperation will be 
mainly industry driven. If they have a commercial and/or a technological interest, companies 
can be quite innovative in dealing with bureaucratic and regulatory hurdles. In particular at 
the less visible – and therefore politically less sensitive – sub-system and component level, 
closer ties are indeed probable. On the other hand, even the big European companies will only 
be able to cooperate on an equal footing with their US counterparts if they maintain their 
capacities as system-integrators and if they remain at the cutting edge of technology – not in 
all, but in specific key areas. This, in turn, will only be possible if European governments 
keep at least a certain level of R&T funding and if they – finally – come to a common 
European strategy for their defence-related industries.  
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